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This paper provides specific estimates on the scale of profit shifting among
hydrocarbon MNEs. We estimate a lower-bound semi-elasticity of reported
profits to sector specific income taxation of -1.88. To assess the importance of
domestic profit-shifting channels, we take advantage of domestic tax differen-
tials among hydrocarbon producers facing additional rent taxes and find that
domestic profit shifting accounts for about one third of total income concealed.
Overall, we estimate revenue losses in the sector due to profit-shifting amount
to 12% - 35% of the income tax base, depending on the characteristics of a
country’s tax regime. We also observe a higher vulnerability of non-OECD
economies to profit shifting in our sample, which consists of 294 domestic and
multinational parents and subsidiaries during the period from 2004-2012. Fi-
nally, our analysis confirms the mitigation effect of documentation requirements
for internal transactions. However, we also find that increased enforcement
prompts MNEs in the Oil and Gas sector to rely more heavily on the realloca-
tion of profits at the domestic level.
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1. Introduction
Income from natural resource endowments is substantial for many economies, frequently
accounting for more than half of government revenue (IMF 2011). Yet, concerns about
the ability of governments to collect a fair share of revenue have led to more scrutiny,
starting with transparency to combat corruption,1 and increasingly targeting the misuse of
tax planning and transfer pricing structures of Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) to shift
profits out of source countries.
A wide body of evidence on general profit shifting has been developed in recent years,
comprehensively summarized by Heckemeyer and Overesch (2013) and Dharmapala (2014).
Using the tax differential of multinational group members (Hines and Rice, 1994; Huizinga
and Laeven, 2008), exogenous earning shocks at the parent level (Dharmapala and Riedel,
2013), or exploring difference in reported sales and earnings of US MNEs (Dyreng and
Markle, 2014) as an identification device, studies typically provide strong evidence of MNEs
taking advantage of differences in taxation among their group members. To date, these
analytical efforts were mainly based on economy-wide information, while initial work on
potential drivers suggests important sectoral differences (Beer and Loeprick, 2015).
To inform the debate on the appropriate taxation of the sector, this paper aims at
providing more specific evidence on the scale of observable profit shifting in the Oil and
Gas sector. In our sample, which consists of 294 domestic and multinational parents
and subsidiaries during the period from 2004-2012, profit shifting is substantial with an
estimated semi-elasticity of reported profits of -1.88. We estimate that this translates into
revenue losses between 12% and 35% of the tax base, depending on the characteristics
of a country’s tax regime. Our results also indicate a higher vulnerability of non-OECD
economies to profit shifting in the hydrocarbon sector.
Actual and perceived vulnerabilities to profit re-allocation may be one source of the
noticeable global variation in fiscal regimes for extractive industries. Our findings are
therefore not only relevant in the context of the ongoing global debate on the risks of tax
base erosion, but have implications for the broader design of fiscal regimes for the Oil and
Gas sector: The susceptibility of profit based instruments to international and national
tax loopholes may justify more reliance on less exposed instruments such as volume based
royalties.2
A second major contribution of our work is the identification of a domestic profit-shifting
channel. The petroleum sector is peculiar in often facing additional profit-based instru-
ments added to regular income taxation. The result is an important domestic tax differen-
tial for multi-sector companies. Redirecting profits from Oil and Gas subsidiaries towards
1The extractive industries have been the first target of tightened transparency requirements in the US
and EU, demanding disclosure of transfers to governments on a country by country basis.
2An observation that has potential relevance beyond the Oil and Gas sector. Brockmeyer et al. (2013)
illustrate that imperfect observation of costs provides justification for turnover rather than profit based
firm taxation in Pakistan.
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affiliates facing just the corporate income tax can thus result in tax gains at the domestic
level. We develop an analytical framework to assess the relevance of this specific profit
misallocation channel, which has thus far been neglected in the profit-shifting literature.
Using a tax differential of domestic Oil and Gas producers with related domestic businesses
in other sectors3 we do indeed find a significant association with reported profits; Domestic
profit shifting reduces reported profits of the petroleum companies in our sample by about
13 percent. Our identification of this shifting channel is based on a novel approach, extend-
ing the cost function of tax planning activities with a fixed cost component as suggested
by Dharmapala (2014).
The findings presented in this paper have practical relevance given that domestic trans-
fer mispricing often seems to be an administrative afterthought in countries’ compliance
management strategies. Documentation requirements for related-party transactions are,
for instance, frequently limited to cross-border transactions.4 To inform administrative
responses, we also investigate the adjustment of firm-level evasion strategies following reg-
ulatory enforcement efforts by national tax administrations. Following Beer and Loeprick
(2015), we look at the effects of introducing transfer pricing documentation requirements as
a proxy for administrative enforcement. We assess the impact of regulation, differentiating
between domestic and international shifting channels, and find that increased enforcement
prompts MNEs in the Oil and Gas sector to rely more heavily on the reallocation of prof-
its at the domestic level. This may be an indication of administrators focusing solely on
controlling international tax planning activities. The finding also underlines the need for
dynamic analysis of taxpayer responses to anti-avoidance measures.
2. Fiscal Regimes for the Oil and Gas Industry
Revenue from the hydrocarbon sector accounts for more than 70% of government revenue
for most countries on the Arabian Peninsula and several African economies. In the produc-
ing countries represented in our sample, such as Colombia, Kazakhstan, Norway, Russia,
and the UK collections from the sector represent a smaller, but still significant share in
total revenue (see Figure 1).
Fiscal regimes for the sector tend to be complex and have a range of country-specific fea-
tures. Most common are corporate income taxes, rent taxes, royalties, export duties and
bonus payments. While corporate income taxes usually apply uniformly, sector-specific
instruments are typically contingent upon distinct factors such as market conditions, the
maturity and quality of the field developed, or production volumes. There is some indi-
3Depending on the position of affiliates within an MNE group in the value-chain we differentiate extraction
and support service activities.
4The UK did not include domestic transactions in the scope of its transfer pricing legislation until 2004
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2014), Romania includes domestic transactions in the scope of its provisions
since 2010 (KPMG, 2014), India only recently, in 2012, extended the scope of transfer pricing to specified
domestic transactions (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2014).
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cation that countries with resource endowments tend to have higher standard corporate
income tax rates (Keen and Mansour, 2010) and a number of resource rich countries are
using differentiated tax rates for the sector. In addition to tax instruments, ownership
arrangements play an important role in government efforts to gain a fair share of resource
rents. Given initial capital requirements, oil fields are frequently developed in joint ventures
of multiple investors. Governments can take part in these, typically through a national
oil company. Alternatively, concessions, used in the majority of OECD economies or pro-
duction sharing contracts (PSCs), which have been adopted in many developing economies
starting in 1960 (for an overview see Bindemann, 1999) specify returns to transfers of de-
velopment or ownership rights.5 Several studies indicate that countries using PSAs are
getting a larger share of resource rents than those relying on concession contracts (John-
ston, 1994; Ravagnani et al., 2012; Luo and Yan, 2010). Even where PSCs are accounting
for the majority of government take, regular income taxes, however, typically remain an
important source of revenue. Consequently, profit shifting to lower the income tax base
remains a concern for all hydrocarbon producing countries, across different fiscal regime
designs.
It is sometimes argued that manipulations of related-party transactions is less of a risk
when observable market prices, such as spot markets for crude oil, are readily available.
This perspective has been challenged by efforts to detect mispricing of crude oil imports6
5Specifying the share of production retained by a private developer to cover cost and a formula for dividing
profits with the government
6Comparing declared values for crude petroleum imports into the European Union and the United States
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and neglects the multitude of other internal transactions that may allow MNEs to over- or
undercharge affiliates in order to optimize global tax liabilities. While the profit shifting
opportunities for a non-diversified producing entity would indeed be limited, insourcing of
services from third parties, related and unrelated, is common among upstream exploration
and production and frequently involves the deployment of highly valuable assets such as
specialized drilling equipment. Similarly, a multiplicity of midstream (refining and trans-
portation) transactions and further services supporting downstream retailing may provide
opportunities for profit reallocation.
Table 1 summarizes the profit- and production-based tax instruments for a range of
countries in our sample for the year 2012. The first column shows CIT rates which apply
to all sectors of the economy. The second column presents sector-specific marginal taxes on
profits which apply in addition to the regular CIT; Due to progressive schedules, cost up-
lift, or exemption thresholds, this figure deviates in some instances from the statutory rate
applied.7 In Norway, for example, the additional tax rate is 50%, implying that the com-
bined tax rate on profits of the sector is 78%. Columns (3) to (5) present production-based
instruments which are either linked to a price measure (Column 4), aimed at safeguarding
rents; or simply the production volume (Column 5), to forestall distortions on marginal
fields;8 or both. Further details on the derivation of rent tax rates is provided in Appendix
D.
The complexity of Oil and Gas regimes requires a few assumptions to determine the
applicable total income tax rate. In the UK, differentiation is needed to separate extraction
projects approved before and after 1996. Reforms in the mid-90s, abolished the Petroleum
Revenue Tax which lowered the total marginal tax rate from 81% to 62%. Based on HMRC
statistics (Joomeen, 2014), we estimate that during the time period covered by our analysis
roughly 25% of profits in the Oil and Gas sector derive from fields given development
consent before 1996. As we are not able to match development consent with our micro-
level database, we employ a weighted average of the rates in the empirical analysis.9
In the case of Kazakhstan, an Excess Profit Tax increases with firm profitability. A
reform in 2009, decreased both general corporate income tax rates and the application
threshold for additional rent taxation from 20% to 25% of profits after taxation as a share
from 2000 - 2010 to market prices, Pak (2012) estimates a total volume of mispricing exceeding 100
Billion USD
7More specifically, we calculate the marginal reduction in tax payments given an incremental decrease
in accounting profits and denote the implied rate by τ . This tax rate may be decomposed into two
components: the regular CIT and a rate associated with additional tax obligations, τ = τCIT + τAdd.
Column (1) presents τCIT and column (2) presents τAdd. If τAdd depends on whether the change in
profits is caused by a change in costs or a change in income, we assume that a unit increase in profits
is caused by changes in both components to a similar degree.
8The mechanism is aimed at more efficient extraction over the life cycle of a field. With lower volumes of
production towards exhaustion of a well, the share of rents captured through royalties is reduced when
marginal rents of the enterprise approach marginal costs.
9In a series of robustness checks we vary the weight attached to older fields from 1/3 to 1/5 and do not
find an effect on our results.
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Table 1: Taxation of oil and gas
Tax Base Profit-based instruments Production-based instruments
Instrument regular CIT Additional tax Royalty P Q
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Colombia 33.00% – 8%-25% X
France 33.33% – –
Italy 31.40% 10.50% 4%-10% X
Kazakhstan 20.00% 10.50% 2.5%-18% X X
Netherlands 25.00% 27.50% 0%-8.25% X X
Norway 28.00% 50.00% –
Poland 19.00% – –
Romania 16.00% – 3%-13.5% X
Russia 20.00% – 35%-60%1 X X
Ukraine 21.00% – Yes∗ X X
United Kingdom 24.00% 42.75 –
Notes: CIT rates are drawn from PwC. We provide details on the calculation of additional tax rates in
Appendix D. ∗ Production royalties have been abolished in 2013 and replaced by subsoil use payments.
of deductible costs. We therefore divide Kazakh firms in two sub-samples, above and below
the mean profitability level of 30% for each year in our sample and calculate the applicable
marginal income tax for these sub-samples.10 For Italian firms in our sample, we account
for a supplementary income tax of 6.5% which was applied to firms in the sector with
annual revenues of more than 25 Million Euro. In 2011, this threshold was lowered to 10
Million Euro and the additional rate increased to 10.5%.
Figure 2 illustrates the development of corporate, sector specific, and combined tax rates
since 2004. While corporate income tax rates decreased significantly within the timeframe
analyzed – slightly more than half a percentage point per year – the combined taxation
of the oil and gas industry remained broadly stable as sector specific rates increased.
Major changes in sector-specific, profit-based tax instruments are summarized in Table 6,
in Appendix B.11
Tax policy for the hydrocarbon sector is endogenous with a strong influence of global
price trends and reserve discoveries on tax regimes. Kazakhstan, for instance, introduced
important changes with a tax reform in 2009 following discoveries, which quadrupled known
10Our results are robust to the variation of thresholds and the number of brackets used. For the sake of
clarity, we only present one specification.
11The table presents reforms of sector-specific instruments. The figure, on the other hand, depicts the
differential of the combined tax rate and the corporate tax rate in the middle panel. This differential
also changes in response to a changing CIT rate if the combined rate is fixed at some level; as is the
case in the Netherlands.
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Notes: The graph illustrates the development of various tax rates since 2004. Equations of time trends are
given on top of each panel with se denoting the standard error of the coefficient.
reserves in 2007. Since oil prices tripled since 2000, many countries reviewed their fiscal
regimes. We therefore need to control for both global price developments and proven
Oil and Gas reserves, depicted in Figure 3, as reported in British Petroleum’s Statistical
Review of World Energy (British Petroleum Company, 2014).
Figure 3
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Notes: Proved reserves and production for selected regions between 2000 and 2012. The dashed line depicts
the oil price. Kazakhstan’s proved reserves quadrupled in 2007 and are not depicted.
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3. Theoretical considerations
Huizinga and Laeven (2008), extending initial work of Hines and Rice (1994), provide a
stylized model to guide our understanding of global profit shifting dynamics. Taking the
perspective of an MNE group with the ability to reallocate profits, they offer a useful ref-
erence in interpreting empirical research. In the context of our work, this model has an
important limitation: It does not offer the possibility to account for differences in trans-
action costs across affiliates in different jurisdictions. The heterogeneity in enforcement
capabilities across countries suggests otherwise. Domestic shifting, for instance, may be
less of a concern for tax administrations and thus be associated with lower overall costs to
a firm. The model also assumes that costs only accrue once profits are being manipulated.
This is questionable, given that firms may be used as intermediaries to reallocate profits
between two other subsidiaries; an activity likely associated with non-negligible costs.
We aim to incorporate these aspects into a simple model to guide our analysis of profit
reallocation in the hydrocarbon sector by using a modified cost function. While domestic
profit shifting is also relevant for other sectors, the hydrocarbon sector is peculiar in often
facing a different statutory tax rate than other sectors. This provides us with an identifi-
cation device. More specifically, we consider a firm in the oil and gas industry which may
adjust taxable profits by shifting income Si to subsidiary i = 1, . . . , N . This activity is
associated with costs C, we allow to depend on the specific channel (affiliate) used as well
as on the total volume of income concealed S =
∑
Si,
C =
1
2P
(
S2
δ
+
N∑
i=1
S2i
γi
)
.
In our cost function, we add a vector of transaction-specific cost parameters γi, which
we allow to depend on regulatory efforts. By distinguishing transaction-specific from the
complementary, local cost parameter, δ, which is not affected by regulation, we account for
the importance of size, suggesting that overall shifting costs are decreasing in the number of
MNE affiliates for a given amount of redirected income. The related notion of a minimum
size threshold for efficient tax optimization, due to a fixed cost component, is frequently
highlighted among practitioners (Dharmapala, 2014, see e.g.). Both transaction-specific
cost parameters and the complementary, local cost parameter are strictly positive. In line
with previous papers (Huizinga and Laeven, 2008; Hines and Rice, 1994), we assume that
marginal costs increase proportionally with the ratio of shifted to actual income, P .
The corporation chooses transactions Si to minimize the tax burden while accounting
for shifting costs. Relevant affiliates of the Oil and Gas producer operate both in the same
jurisdiction but in different sectors and abroad. By letting ti denote the tax rate applied to
profits of affiliate i and t0 the strictly higher rate of the oil and gas producer, we summarize
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the problem with:12
max
{Si}Ni=1
(1− t0)[P − S] +
N∑
i=1
(1− ti)Si − C. (1)
Due to the convexity of the cost function, after-tax profits attain a maximum at
P (t0 − ti) = Si/γi + S/δ for all i, (2)
implying that marginal gains from any reallocation of true profits, P (tj − ti), between
affiliate i and j must balance the associated, transaction-specific costs Si/γi − Sj/γj . Ac-
cordingly, once the overall magnitude of profit reallocation is determined, its distribution
among affiliated subsidiaries is only influenced by transaction-specific costs and incentives.
The overall magnitude, however, is also a function of the producer’s local cost parameter
δ. Summing (2) over i and rearranging gives an explicit expression for income concealed
at the oil and gas industry level:
S =
Pδ
δ +
∑
j γj
N∑
i=1
γi(t0 − ti). (3)
suggesting that the logarithm of reported profits, P − S, in the oil and gas industry is
approximately given by
ln(P − S) ≈ lnP − µ
N∑
i=1
γi
γ
τ i (4)
where τ i = N−1(t0 − ti) is the tax differential between the oil and gas sector and affiliate
i, divided by the total number of affiliates, µ = δNγ/(δ +
∑
i γi) is the (approximate)
semi-elasticity of reported profits with respect to a country’s taxation of the Oil and Gas
sector and γ is an average transaction-specific cost parameter.
The model provides a range of intuitive and useful insights. First, it predicts that
larger corporations will conceal a larger share of true profits. This is obvious from (4)
and noting that µ is increasing in N . We will use this observation in our identification
strategy below. Second, it clarifies the internal response to increasing transaction-specific
costs following, for instance, government efforts to counter transfer mispricing. Using the
first order condition together with (3), we find
−∂Sk
∂γk
= −Sk
γk
(
1− γk
δ +
∑
j γj
)
, −∂Si
∂γk
=
γi
γk
Sk
γk
γi
δ +
∑
j γj
for all k, i, such that k 6= i.
12A more general framework would treat all affiliates symmetrically and relate costs to each potential pair of
subsidiaries within the group. Such a model, however, would not provide further insights. We therefore
rely on this simple asymmetric approach.
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Increasing transactions-specific costs between affiliate k and the firm in the oil and gas
industry will thus, as expected, result in a smaller magnitude of income shifted through this
channel. The second expression reveals compensatory adjustments in firm behavior. Rising
costs of one channel will increase the reliance on shifting opportunities with unaffected
affiliates in the MNE group.
4. Empirical analysis
4.1. Estimation Approach
In our empirical analysis, we seek to determine (i.) the overall magnitude of income
concealed, (ii.) the relative importance of domestic and foreign profit shifting, and (iii.)
the consequences of intensified enforcement efforts. To investigate these issues, we rely
on the framework derived above and set transaction-specific costs at the same level across
foreign jurisdictions, i.e γi = γ¯ for i 6= 1 (affiliate 1 is located domestically). Furthermore,
we allow transaction-specific costs to be driven by tax administrations’ regulatory efforts,
depicted by the variable φ, while we treat the local cost parameter as fixed. With our
estimation equation 5 below, we thus aim to find approximations of γ1 = f(φ), γ¯ = g(φ),
and δ to determine the magnitude and distribution of income concealed.
Our baseline specification builds on a linearization of (4) and is based on the premise that
there exists an intermediate level of regulation, φ¯, at which transaction-specific costs are
approximately uniform (f(φ) = g(φ), for φ = φ¯). We present details on the linearization
and identification of parameters in Annex A.13
ln(EBIT )it = β1τit + β2τit(Nit − N¯) + β3τDit (φit − φ¯) + β4τFit (φit − φ¯) + xit + νi + it.
(5)
We use Earnings before Interest and Taxes (EBIT) as a measure for reported profits (P−S).
Tax differentials at the domestic level are denoted as τD = N−1(t0 − t1) and international
differences are captured by τF = N−1
∑
i 6=1(t0 − ti). The composite tax differential is
defined as τ = τF + τD and its coefficient, the estimated semi-elasticity of reported profits,
is expected to take a negative sign. We use the number of countries of an MNE’s operation
as a measure for N . Our model predicts the elasticity of reported profits to increase in the
number of affiliates and we therefore expect to observe a negative coefficient.
We capture the change in transaction-specific costs by interacting the tax differentials
with the number of years since the introduction of mandatory documentation requirements
in a firm’s jurisdiction, the variable φ. Given that stricter enforcement should increase
transaction-specific costs to a similar degree, we expect positive coefficients for these in-
teractions. As illustrated in Annex A, a difference in the estimated coefficients indicates
13We estimate various unrestricted versions and cannot reject the assumption γ1 = γ¯ in any of our specifi-
cations.
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varied effectiveness of documentation in increasing the costs of profit shifting of domestic
and international channels.
Finally, the vector x contains firm-specific controls such as the value of fixed and other
assets, the number of employees, time-specific variables including the average annual price
of crude oil,14 as well as country-specific variables including GDP, population size, the
unemployment rate, inflation, the amount of proved reserves, and the tax to GDP ratio.
Other time invariant characteristics of firms are captured by νi and it are idiosyncratic
errors.
4.2. Data and sample selection
Our firm-level micro data on MNEs in the Oil and Gas industry are extracted from the OR-
BIS database. We download all available firms, with affiliates in other sectors domestically
or abroad,15 and restrict the downloaded sample to firms providing at least three years
information on EBIT, fixed assets and total assets. We drop observations whose ownership
structure is not known. In line with previous research (Heckemeyer and Overesch, 2013),
we restrict the sample to profitable entities and only include observations with reported
assets.
We summarize the distribution of our baseline sample across countries in Table 2. Around
40% of the observations are located in the UK, followed by Russia (20%), Norway, and the
Netherlands (10%). To differentiate observations according to group structure we depict
foreign (MNE) and domestic (Intra) separately. The last column of Table 2 summarizes
observations with both domestic and foreign affiliates. With fewer domestic relationships
captured in our sample, we expect less accuracy for estimates relying on intra-national tax
differentials. It is notable that about 24% of the affiliates in our sample are part of an
MNE that has operations in a tax haven.
The number of employees is not reported for around 43% of all observations. We im-
pute missing values based on estimates of the function Labor = f(EBIT,K, z) subject
to Labor ≥ 1, where K denotes the value of total assets, and z contains country-specific
variables. Using a censored regression model we obtain
̂ln(Labor) = −2.98
(3.04)
+ 0.59
(0.02)
ln(Assets) + 1.18
(0.55)
ln(GdpPc)− 2.22
(0.95)
ln(Inflation),
14We include this control variable for two reasons. First, we avoid an endogeneity problem as the price
of crude affects both tax policy and profits. Second, capital and labor are likely not the only inputs
used in the hydrocarbon sector. Several unobserved factors are likely linked to global price levels. The
inclusion of market prices thus adds to the precision of our true profits estimate. Note that we can not
use time-fixed effects as a result of using time specific continuous variables.
15We categorize observational units as affiliates if they own each other – directly or totally – by at least
70%.
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Table 2
Distribution of Baseline Sample
Observations
Country Firms Total MNE Intra Both
Great Britain 122 669 348 48 273
Russia 60 306 306 0 0
Norway 23 125 100 23 2
Netherlands 29 118 19 0 99
France 9 64 64 0 0
Ukraine 11 60 60 0 0
Italy 9 50 15 35 0
Colombia 7 38 38 0 0
Spain 6 37 37 0 0
Kazakhstan 8 25 16 9 0
Poland 4 16 16 0 0
Romania 6 15 15 0 0
Total 294 1523 1034 115 374
Notes: Descriptive statistics. Column Firms gives the number of independent multinationals (N). Columns labeled
Total, MNE, Intra and Both give the total number of observations (N×T), the number of observations on MNEs
without domestic subsidiaries, domestic firms with associated entities in another sector, and MNEs with associated
entities in the same country but other sector.
with Infl denoting an inflation index. Standard errors are in parentheses. A set of time
and country fixed effects is included in the regression and used in predicting values.16
As part of our robustness checks, we re-estimate our main specification based on obser-
vations with reported staffing levels. We thus investigate the magnitude of a potential bias
stemming from the omission of firm-fixed effects and measurement error.17
4.3. Results
Table 3 presents our baseline results. With a magnitude of -3.15 and -1.26 our tax dif-
ferential coefficients are significantly negative. Reported profit of an Oil and Gas firm in
our sample is thus partly driven by the difference in the tax rates of both its domestic and
foreign affiliates. In line with our theoretical framework, the interaction of the tax differ-
entials with the number of affiliated companies facing a different income tax treatment is
negative. Larger networks thus seem to lend themselves to more effective tax planning.
16We do not include firm-specific fixed effects in order to improve out-of-sample forecasting.
17Note that the coefficient on capital is inconsistent with customary production functions. If labor and
capital are the only productive factors one should, holding output fixed, expect a negative coefficient
on capital for its ability to substitute for labor. Introducing firm-specific fixed effects does not change
the sign of the estimated coefficient.
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The observed coefficients on the factors of production indicate slightly decreasing returns
to scale. As expected, global market dynamics matter: We find a significantly positive price
effect for crude oil with a magnitude of around one. To provide insights into the importance
of royalty regime design, we interact the price variable with a dummy taking the value of
one if the specific observation is located in a country with price dependent royalty regimes
(Kazakhstan, the Netherlands, Romania, Russia, or Ukraine). The coefficient is negative
with a magnitude of around -0.5 implying that profits in these countries are less affected
by movements in global prices; the difference likely bolstering public coffers in times of
booming oil markets. On average profits fell from 2004-2012 as indicated by our time
trend; this effect is likely driven by the impact of the financial crisis in 2008.
Our country level controls follow standard assumptions. The expected risk-reward rela-
tionship likely explains higher profit levels observed among companies operating in coun-
tries with lower GDP per capita and higher macroeconomic volatility. Overall economic
performance captured via unemployment levels does seem to affect our findings. Higher
levels of unemployment are linked to higher observed profit levels, possibly also indicating
a remuneration for macro-risks or depressed input prices.
Given that the coefficients on the tax differentials are not statistically different, we replace
our foreign and domestic tax differential with a composite variable in specification (2). The
coefficient of -1.62 suggests that reported profits decrease by 1.62 percent in response to a
one percentage point increase of the combined tax rate. This finding is substantial and in
line with previous cross-sectoral analysis. Studies on profit-shifting summarized in a recent
meta-survey by Heckemeyer and Overesch (2013) typically find estimated semi-elasticities
of around -1.
In the following specifications, we investigate the effectiveness of regulation to mitigate
profit-shifting behavior by interacting the tax differentials with our documentation variable.
We alternate between an unrestricted approach, testing the uniformity of transaction-
specific costs, and a restricted version where we increase the efficiency of our estimates
by using the composite tax differential. Throughout, we observe a negative coefficient
on the foreign tax differential interaction, suggesting that documentation has an impact
on profit shifting activity. While the coefficients cannot be directly interpreted to derive
the magnitude of mitigation, the observed difference already allows us to conclude that
enforcement efforts are more successful for foreign affiliates.18 The increase in costs of
shifting profits to affiliates abroad is significantly higher than for the mispricing of internal
domestic transactions.
We introduce time fixed effects in specifications (5) and (6). While the magnitude of
observed effects tends to be slightly lower, our findings remain consistent across both
specifications. Overall, the elasticity of observable profit shifting in the Oil and Gas sector
18The coefficients capture a combination of effects: The overall change in profit shifting as well as the
adjustment in the mix of shifting channels employed by firms with both domestic and foreign affiliates.
Their difference, however, indicates the partial effect of documentation on transaction-specific costs, as
shown in Annex A.
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depends both on the size of entities and the regulatory regimes they are facing. Our
preferred specification (6), which we later use for a more detailed discussion of effects,
implies an approximate semi-elasticity of around -1.88 for an average MNE with operations
in 2.8 income tax regimes (domestic and/or foreign) in a country that has introduced
mandatory transfer pricing documentation 1.6 years ago.
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Table 3
Within Estimation, 2004–2012
Dependent: logarithm of EBIT
Explanatory variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
τD -3.15** -1.62*** -2.86** -2.12*** -2.53* -1.88***
(1.26) (0.55) (1.38) (0.59) (1.47) (0.70)
τF -1.26** -1.92*** -1.73**
(0.60) (0.65) (0.74)
τD:zN -1.92 -2.35 -2.18
(2.05) (2.09) (2.10)
τF :zN -0.58 -0.42 -0.42
(0.66) (0.67) (0.66)
τ
τ :zN -0.90** -0.84* -0.80*
(0.45) (0.46) (0.46)
zDoc 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
τDzDoc -0.05 -0.08 -0.04 -0.07
(0.18) (0.17) (0.19) (0.18)
τF zDoc 0.25** 0.24** 0.24** 0.23**
(0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11)
̂ln(Labor) 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.13***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
ln(Fixed Assets) 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.15*** 0.15***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
ln(Other Assets) 0.41*** 0.41*** 0.41*** 0.41*** 0.41*** 0.41***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
ln(Price) 0.91*** 0.90*** 1.04*** 1.02***
(0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.19)
ln(Price):Royalty -0.42 -0.42* -0.61** -0.61** -0.63** -0.63**
(0.25) (0.25) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30)
ln(GDP) -0.24 -0.21 -0.16 -0.16 -0.04 -0.04
(0.30) (0.30) (0.32) (0.32) (0.35) (0.35)
ln(Population) -4.28 -4.36 -7.81** -7.84** -7.62** -7.63**
(2.73) (2.70) (3.56) (3.55) (3.71) (3.71)
ln(Unemployment) 0.40* 0.41* 0.53** 0.53** 0.49** 0.48**
(0.21) (0.21) (0.22) (0.22) (0.23) (0.23)
Inflation -0.03** -0.03** -0.03** -0.03** -0.03* -0.03*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Tax/GDP 0.04 0.04 0.05* 0.05* 0.04 0.04
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Reserves 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Timetrend -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Time fixed effects X X
Observations 1523 1523 1523 1523 1523 1523
Adj. R2 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20
Notes:*,**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. Robust standard errors in paren-
theses. The tax differentials τD, τF , and τ are defined in the text. All specifications are estimated with a
sample including 331 non-zero observations on the domestic, and 1140 non-zero observations on the foreign
tax differential.
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4.4. Robustness Checks
Table 4 presents a series of robustness checks. We start by investigating differences in the
vulnerability of OECD and non-OECD economies to profit shifting in the hydrocarbon
sector. The variable NonOECD takes the value of one for observations not located in
a member state of the OECD. We interacted this variable with the entire vector of tax-
variables, including the domestic and foreign tax differential as well as their interaction with
size and documentation requirements. For simplicity, however, we only present a restricted
version with significant coefficients in column (1). The interaction between NonOECD
and the composite tax differential is negative, suggesting that profit shifting is more of a
risk in less developed economies. Moreover larger networks seem to matter even more in
facilitating tax minimization outside of the OECD.
In our second and third specification, we contrast profit shifting behavior amongst MNEs
which have an affiliate in a tax haven and those which do not. We find that the latter
group, around 23% of our sample, is substantially more responsive to variations in the tax
rate. Since tax differentials of these entities are larger on average, MNEs with tax haven
operations also report less profit, in absolute terms, than their non-haven peers.
We investigate the potential of measurement problems in specifications (4) and (5).
Current, unweighted, statutory tax differentials may be a crude proxy for actual tax mini-
mization opportunities and various other measures, including weighted statutory tax rates
(Huizinga and Laeven, 2008) and effective tax rates (Collins et al., 1998) have been used
instead. Klassen and Laplante (2012) suggest that profit shifting incentives are more stable
over time due to adjustment costs of established operations. To quantify the magnitude of
attenuation bias introduced by relying on current rates, we employ weighted average tax
differentials where we take the average over two (specification 4) and three years (spec-
ification 5), respectively. This increases the estimated semi-elasticity of reported profits
considerable. However, it also inflates related standard errors.
Another concern is that contemporaneous tax rates, particularly in the oil and gas sector,
may be correlated with time varying unobservables, other than the oil price or proven
reserves, also affecting profits of the sector. If current tax differentials are endogenous
in our baseline specification, so are the weighted average tax differentials used above. In
the following specifications, we thus re-estimate our baseline equation using last year’s tax
differentials (specification 6) and the tax differentials of the last two years (specification
7), respectively, as instruments. If actual tax minimization incentives are stable over time,
these instruments also forestall potential measurement bias. With increased coefficients
on the composite tax differential, the results indeed suggest some form of measurement
problem. However associated standard errors do not provide relevant estimation limits.
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In specification (8), we remove observations with EBIT margins in excess of 82 percent,
amounting to 5% of our sample. The estimated magnitude of profit shifting increases to
-2.21 as a result, with other effects remaining largely unchanged. Subsequently, in the
ninth specification, we interact the labor variable with a dummy taking the value of one if
the number of employees was not available for this observation to test for a potential bias
introduced by imputing staff numbers for about half of our observations. Both the dummy
variable and its interaction with the labor variable are not statistically significant. In
specification (10), we further restrict our sample to firms which provide information on the
number of employees. The coefficient on labor input and our point estimate of the elasticity
of taxable profits (-1.30) decrease slightly as a result. Importantly, due to a reduction
in the sample size of around 43% the quality of the estimate is significantly reduced.
However, we continue to find a significantly positive interaction between documentation
requirements and the foreign tax differential. Finally, in specification (11) and (12) we test
our assumption that 1/3 of profits in the UK derive from fields given development consent
before 1996. In column (11) we decrease this share to 1/5 and in column (12) we increase
it to 1/3. Our results remain unchanged.
5. Interpretation
To identify the relative importance of domestic and international profit shifting channels
and their response to regulatory enforcement efforts, we employ the theoretical framework
established above (Section 3). More specifically, we combine our estimation results with
a linearized version of our model and resolve the resulting set of equations. We may thus
retrieve the hypothesized cost parameters (Annex A presents details), which allows us to
calculate both the magnitude and distribution of income concealed for each firm in our
sample.
Based on specification (7) of our baseline results (Table 3), we obtain the following
estimates of our structural cost parameters:
δ̂ = 8.48, f̂(φ¯) = ĝ(φ¯) = 1.33, ĝ′(φ¯) = −0.17. f̂ ′(φ¯) = 0.04. (6)
We thus find that the costs of transfer mispricing are increasing in the number of years
since mandatory documentation requirements have been introduced for transactions with
foreign affiliates. However, they are slightly decreasing for domestic affiliates. This result
seems counterintuitive. It could, however, be linked to two related challenges in practical
enforcement efforts to counter transfer mispricing. First, in many cases the scope of trans-
fer pricing legislation is restricted to international transactions. The UK, for instance, ex-
tended its transfer pricing legislation to cover domestic arrangements only in 2004. Second,
scarce resources in tax administrations are likely to be focused on international transac-
tions, given their high potential for revenue losses. This focus of attention on international
18
affiliates following the introduction of mandatory documentation requirements could mean
that the costs associated with domestic arrangements are actually decreasing.19
In order to investigate the actual extent of profit shifting, we combine our structural
parameter estimates with firm-level data and simulate optimal reallocation strategies for
each firm in our sample. Table 5 summarizes our findings. It depicts average values for
the entire sample as well as two subsamples, differentiating firms located in countries using
additional profit based rent taxes for the sector. We calculated standard errors of these
average values by repeating the estimation and averaging process 750 times with random
subsamples of our baseline sample.20 Profit shifting is substantial, but varies noticeably
among firms in our sample. The mean value of concealed income is around 43% among
firms that are located in countries with additional income based instruments (Column 2),
and just about 12% when the sector is not facing additional income taxes (Column 3). Tax
minimization activities come with considerable expenses. We estimate that, on average,
5% of before tax profits are spent to relocate income. This share is considerably higher in
countries with additional income-based instruments (7%), than in countries with regular
corporate income taxation (1%).
Table 5
Simulated profit shifting across subsamples
Average Level (in %) Average Semi-elasticity (in%)
Subsample All firms Add. profit tax CIT only All firms Add. profit tax CIT only
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Share of profits concealed 31.61 42.83 12.83 -8.86 -7.17 -11.64
(1.52) (1.47) (2.07) (0.49) (0.48) (0.94)
Concealment costs as share of profits 4.61 6.68 1.14 -8.77 -7.04 -11.64
(0.28) (0.36) (0.14) (0.48) (0.48) (0.94)
Domestic Share of profit shifting 21.21 33.46 0.00 6.36 6.36 –
(2.35) (3.30) (0.00) (0.49) (0.49)
Revenue Loss 27.30 35.95 12.83 -9.75 -8.61 -11.64
(1.36) (1.41) (2.07) (0.44) (0.44) (0.94)
Notes: Table depicts mean levels and semi-elasticities with respect to an additional year of documentation require-
ments, in percent, for the entire sample (All firms) and two subsamples: Firms which are located in countries with
additional profit based tax instruments in the Oil and Gas sector (Rent based) and those which are just subject to the
standard income tax regime (CIT-based). Standard errors, calculated by bootstrapping, are depicted in parentheses.
For our sample of firms located in countries with additional income-based taxes, we
estimate that around one third of total income concealed is shifted to domestic affiliates.
Domestic shifting does, however, only constitute a partial loss of tax revenues. Profits
19It is also plausible that our estimate is imprecise, with a more likely - though still remarkable - scenario
being unchanged costs of domestic shifting activities.
20Note that firm structures are taken as given in this process and average values may thus not be extrap-
olated on a different set of firms.
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will still be taxed in the same jurisdiction, albeit at a lower rate. In order to contrast the
revenue impact of profit shifting across our subsamples, we define revenue losses as
Revenue Loss = 1− Tax Payments
Tax Obligation
.
Given that redirected income invariably ends up abroad for MNEs without domestic shift-
ing opportunities, the figure corresponds to the share of profits concealed in regular CIT
countries. For countries with additional income-based instruments, tax payments are given
by (P −S)τ +S1τ1, where (P −S) are reported profits in the oil and gas industry, τ is the
combined tax rate on profits of the sector and S1 are profits concealed domestically with
the associated tax rate denoted by τ1. Using this definition, we find that, on average, a
third of the Oil and Gas sector’s income tax obligations are not collected.
Increased enforcement efforts change both the magnitude and distribution of income
concealed. Columns (4)-(6) present the corresponding average semi elasticity of each vari-
able of our subsamples. We find that an additional year of documentation requirements
decreases the total volume of income concealed by 9% across all firms in our sample. In
line with our cost estimates, transfer-pricing enforcement is significantly more successful
in curbing international reallocation strategies. The reduction is around 12% in countries
without additional rent taxes; it is only 7% in high tax regimes with domestic shifting
channels. However, the lower elasticity of income shifting for the latter group is also due
to an increased reliance on domestic affiliates. Increasing documentation requirements by
one year inflates the share of domestic profit shifting by around 6%. The combined effect
implies a 9% reduction of governmental revenue losses.
The estimated increase in the gap between international and domestic profit shifting
costs suggests that MNEs with both foreign and domestic affiliates have, in the last decade,
increased their reliance on domestic channels while those with only foreign affiliates could
not. To further investigate the impact of transfer pricing regulation, we plot the estimated
distribution and magnitude of profit shifting between 2004 and 2012 in Figure 4. The first
panel depicts the actual extent of profit shifting, differentiating domestic and international
profit reallocation for our sample of firms located in countries with additional income
based tax instruments. The red line depicts revenue losses. In our sample, the level
of international profit misallocation remains relatively constant while domestic shifting
activities increased.
Notably, the observed distribution is driven by both a changing tax environment and
regulatory reforms. To separate these effects, we provide a high-level depiction of counter-
factuals in the following panels. First, in panel 2, we estimate profit shifting if documenta-
tion requirements would have remained at the level of 2004 when only 5% of firms in our
sample had to comply with reporting obligations. With decreasing CIT rates, particularly
pronounced in non oil-producing countries, international profit-shifting would have surged
by around 15 percentage points of true profits. The third panel depicts the partial effect of
documentation if tax rates had remained unchanged. In 2004, firms in our sample were on
20
Figure 4
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Notes: First panel depicts the amount of intra- and inter-national profit shifting, for income-based tax regimes,
in percent of real profits. The second (third) panel depict partial effects of taxation (documentation) by keeping
documentation rules (taxation) constant based on values observed in 2004. The red line depicts revenue losses.
average required to submit documentation for just 2 months. By 2012 this figure increased
to 3.8 years, with over 90% of firms facing regulation.
6. Conclusion
Our analysis provides specific estimates of the scale of profit shifting among hydrocarbon
MNEs. Looking at firms in the Oil and Gas sector with domestic and multinational affili-
ates, we estimate a lower-bound semi-elasticity of reported profits to sector specific income
taxation of -1.88. We use the existence of domestic tax differentials among hydrocarbon
producers to assess the importance of domestic profit-shifting channels. Amid firms facing
additional rent taxes in our sample, domestic profit shifting accounts for about one third
of total income concealed.
Our analysis suggests that profit shifting has non-negligible revenue effects, amounting
to a reduction of the corporate income tax base between 12% up to 35%, the later number
applying to firms operating in countries using supplementary rent-taxes. We also find that
less developed economies are more vulnerable to profit shifting in the sector. Finally, we
confirm earlier findings on the contribution of documentation requirements in countering
aggressive international transfer-mispricing. Notably, however, we also find that increased
enforcement prompts MNEs in the Oil and Gas sector to rely more heavily on the reallo-
cation of profits at the domestic level.
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Our results are relevant for the ongoing debate regarding the optimal design of fiscal
regimes for the sector. Reliance on production based royalties and, to a lesser extent, ring-
fencing arrangements, limiting the scope for profit consolidation and deductions across
projects and activities, can help reduce vulnerabilities. The tax base for royalties - unless
they are profit based - tends to be easier to observe and thus preferable from an admin-
istrative perspective;21 being less exposed to tax planning arrangements, including the
reallocation of profits through transfer mispricing of debt shifting by MNEs. In a number
of countries, a higher revenue take from hydrocarbon income would likely require more
investment into enforcement capacity, more reliance on less vulnerable instruments, or a
combination of both.
21Noting that the observation of the volume and/or value of production does still pose numerous challenges
(see Calder, 2010) and information asymmetries remain, though arguably at a lower level.
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A. Identification
We let subsidiary 1 be domiciled domestically and restrict transaction-specific costs to be
constant across foreign jurisdictions, γi = γ¯, for i = 2, . . . , N . We may thus write the
proportional amount of income concealed as
S/P = z(γ1τ
D + γ¯τF ) ≡ Γ, (7)
where τD = (t0 − t1)/N and τF = 1/N
∑
i 6=1(t0 − ti) will be referred to as domestic and
foreign tax differentials and z = δN/(δ+
∑
i γi) is a function of the cost parameters and a
group’s size.
We assume that transaction-specific costs are affected by enforcement efforts, φ, and
aim to find approximations of γ1 = f(φ) and γ¯ = g(φ) in order to calculate the impact
of increased enforcement on the magnitude and distribution of income concealed. Note
that the proportional amount of income concealed is a nonlinear function of both a group’s
size and regulatory efforts, Γ(φ,N), two observables. Given that there exists some level of
regulation φ¯ at which f(φ¯) = g(φ¯) = γ – an assumption we test in the empirical analysis
– we can linearize Γ as follows
Γ(φ,N) ≈ γδN¯
δ + N¯γ
τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Γ(φ¯,N¯)
+
γδ2
(δ + N¯γ)2
τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
ΓN (φ¯,N¯)
N˜ +
[(
∂z
∂φ
γ + zf ′(φ¯)
)
τD +
(
∂z
∂φ
γ + zg′(φ¯)
)
τF
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Γφ(φ¯,N¯)
φ˜,
(8)
where X˜ = (X − X¯), the composite tax differential22 is defined as τ = τD + τF and the
change in z is given by
∂z
∂φ
= − δN¯
(δ + N¯γ)2
[
f ′(φ¯) + (N − 1)g′(φ¯)] . (9)
In the empirical analysis, we employ the relation ln(P − S) = ln(P )− Γ +  and estimate
ln(P − S) = β1τ + β2τN˜ + β3τDφ˜+ β4τF φ˜ (10)
to identify the model’s parameters. According to (8) we expect negative coefficients on both
the composite tax differential and its interaction with the number of affiliates N . Further-
more, we expect positive coefficients on both τF φ˜ and τDφ˜ if mandatory documentation
increases domestic and foreign transaction costs to a similar degree.23
Note that the model’s parameters are nonlinear functions of the estimated coefficients.
We may therefore not apply linear tests to identify any of these. However, approximation
22We use ∂τ/∂N = 0 in this approximation, which holds if the average tax rate across affiliated jurisdictions
is independent of the number of jurisdictions.
23Specifically, assuming that f() and g() are non-increasing functions of φ, both tax differential interactions
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(8) reveals that β4 − β3 is an estimate for z(f ′(φ¯) − g′(φ¯)). We may thus conclude that
documentation requirements were significantly more effective in increasing the costs of
foreign profit shifting if the linear restriction β4 − β3 ≤ 0 must be rejected.
We obtain the model’s parameters by combining (8) with (10) and solving the implied
system of equations. The point estimates of the cost parameters are given by
γ̂ =
β21
β2N¯2
, and δ̂ =
β21
β1 − N¯β2 . (11)
The estimates of the partial derivatives f() and g() around this point are more complex
functions of the estimated coefficients and implicitly defined by
ĝ′(φ¯) =
β3 − (β3 − β4)(1− x)
(1−Nx)zˆ , and f̂
′(φ¯) =
β3 − β4
zˆ
+ ĝ′(φ¯), (12)
where zˆ = β2N¯
2/β1 and x = (δˆ + N¯ γˆ)
−1.
B. Reforms of Sector-specific Tax Instruments
Table 6
Reforms of sector-specific profit instruments for selected countries, 2004–2012
Year Country Tax instrument Change
2006 United Kingdom Supplementary Charge to Income Tax Rate increased from 10% to 20%.
2008 Italy Surcharge on oil, gas and energy sector Instrument introduced as part of
fiscal consolidation at a rate of 5.6%
2009 Kazakhstan Excess Profit Tax Threshold for exempted amount
changed.
2011 United Kingdom Supplementary Charge to Income Tax Further increase to 32%.
2011 Italy Surcharge on oil, gas and energy sector Increase in rate to 10.3% until 2013.
are positive if and only if the relative change in transaction-specific costs lies within the following bounds
γ
δ + γ
<
g′(φ¯)
f ′(φ¯)
< 1 +
δ
(N − 1)γ .
The first inequality ensures that documentation requirements were sufficiently effective in raising the
relative costs of foreign profit shifting. If it holds, we expect a positive coefficient on the foreign tax
differential interaction. The second inequality is satisfied whenever regulatory efforts were not overly
efficient in increasing the relative costs of international profit shifting and is linked to a positive coefficient
on the other tax differential.
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C. Documentation Requirements
Reporting obligations
Country Year effective Relevant rulings Penalty
Colombia 2004 Law 788 and 863, enacted in 2002 and 2003, estab-
lished transfer pricing practice in Tax Code. Reg-
ulatory Decree 4340 published in 2004 provides
transfer pricing guidelines, including the contents
of statutory transfer pricing documentation.
Penalties for partial non-
compliance with transfer
pricing documentation.
Reduction in penalties if
documentation is presented
within the prescribed time
limit.
Spain 2009 Law 36/2006 on Measures for Preventing Tax
Fraud was approved in 2006. Law enacted by
Royal Decree 1793/2008, and the documentation
requirements specified therein, are applicable as
from 2009.
Penalty for incomplete doc-
umentation.
France 2010 Transfer pricing regulation established in CGI,
Article 57 and enacted in 1933. Reversal of the
burden of proof in certain audit situations in 1996.
Documentation requirements, codified as Article
L 13 AA, enacted into law in December 2009.
These requirements apply after January 2010.
Penalty protection for com-
plying with the require-
ments.
United Kingdom 2009 Current transfer prancing rules, enacted in 2010,
represents a restatement of the previous rules
which were contained in ICTA 1988 and which
took effect in 1999. Since 2004 rules apply to UK-
to-UK transactions. Changes to HMRC’s general
information powers introduced with effect from 1
April 2009.
Since 2009 HMRC can re-
quire any person to pro-
vide them with information.
Penalties may arise for fail-
ing to comply with an infor-
mation notice.
Italy 2010 Basic transfer pricing rule contained in Article
110(7) of the Italian Income Tax Code, enacted
in 1986. Penalty protection regime for taxpayer
preparing documentation converted into Law 122
in 2010.
Documentation not manda-
tory but a a condition re-
quired to prevent applica-
tion of penalties.
Kazakhstan 2009 Transfer pricing and the arm’s length concept in-
troduced as a separate law in January 2009. The
law sets out formal transfer pricing documenta-
tion requirements for transactions eligible for the
authorities’ control.
Special penalties are in
place for failure to com-
ply with documentation
requirements.
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Documentation requirements
Country Year effective Relevant rulings Penalty
Netherlands 2002 Specific transfer pricing provision included in Ar-
ticle 8b of the Duth Corporate Income Tax Act
since 2002. The legislation also contains the re-
quirement to maintain data that demonstrates the
arm’s length nature of the transfer prices and how
these prices have been derived.
In the absence of sufficient
documentation, the burden
of proof shifts from the
Dutch Tax Authority to the
taxpayer.
Norway 2008 Transfer pricing rules incorporated into the Gen-
eral Tax Act 1999. Transfer pricing documen-
tation and reporting requirements became effec-
tive from fiscal year 2008. If the taxpayer does
not submit the requested information, the tax au-
thorities may base an assessment on the available
facts.
Sufficient information about
uncertain transactions
should be filed in order to
avoid use of penalty tax.
Poland 2001 Arm’s length principle introduced by Article 11 of
the Corporate Income Tax Act in 1992. Statutory
transfer pricing documentation requirements are
stipulated in Article 9a and enacted in 2001.
Documentation provides for
penalty protection.
Romania 2008 Transfer pricing rules introduced in 1994 and clar-
ified in 2004. The obligation to have specific
transfer pricing documentation available was en-
forced in 2008. Since 2010 obligation to document
domestic intra-group transactions.
Failure to comply with doc-
umentation requirements is
punished. Tax authorities
may establish arm’s length
price if documentation in-
complete.
Russia 2012 Transfer pricing provisions in force since 1999.
New rules, containing documentation require-
ments, became effective in 2012.
Penalty relief for taxpay-
ers having complied with re-
porting requirements in a
timely manner.
Ukraine 2013 Transfer pricing provisions came into force in
2013. Regime is currently being revised
–
D. Derivation of Rent Tax Rates
D.1. UK
UK’s fiscal regime for the oil and gas sector is a combination of three profit-based instru-
ments: The ring-fenced Corporation Tax (CT); the Supplementary Charge to Corporation
Tax (SCT); and, the Petroleum Revenue Tax (PRT). PRT applies on a field-by-field basis
to fields given development consent before 16 March 1993. For CT and SCT purposes,
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PRT payments are deductible, implying combined tax rates of
τ before 1996 =τc + τs + τp(1− τc + τs),
τ after 1996 =τs + τc
for firms given development consent before and after 1996, respectively, where rates of the
various instruments are denoted by τi. In 2012, these combined rates were 81% and 62%.
As we are not able to match development consents given on specific fields with firms
in our dataset, we need to rely on a weighted average combined tax rate in our empirical
analysis.24 In order to guide our understanding of appropriate weights, we employ HMRC
statistics and estimate the share of aggregate profits stemming from fields that received
development consent before 1996.
To facilitate the exercise, we assume that average profits P of firms given development
consent before and after 1996 are the same. Letting the share of firms belonging to the
former group be denoted by x, aggregate receipts by tax instrument are given by
PRTA = Pτpx,
SCA = Pτs(1− xτp),
CTA = Pτc(1− xτp),
T otal = P [xτp(1− τ) + τ ] ,
where τ = τc+τs. Next, divide the first three equations above by total receipts and denote
these shares by lower-case letters to find three estimates of x
x = (
τs
sc
− τ)
[
τp(1− τ) + τsτp
sc
]−1
,
x = (
τc
ct
− τ)
[
τp(1− τ) + τcτp
ct
]−1
,
x = τ
[
τp
prt
− τp(1− τ)
]−1
.
Using data on revenue shares and tax rates for the years 2004–2012, we estimate this set
of equations by OLS and find xˆ = 0.25, (se=0.02).
The estimated share of 1/4 is obtained under the unlikely assumption that profits are
independent of when the field was developed. If marginal costs increase with the maturity
of the field, the estimated coefficient is more likely a lower bound of the actual share. In
the empirical analysis, we nevertheless use 1/4 as a baseline specification and define
τuk(0.25) = 0.25τ before 1996 + (1− 0.25)τ after 1996
but perform robustness-checks with x equal to 1/5 and 1/3.
24All firms in our sample were incorporated before 1996. However, this does not imply on which share of
profits PRT applies.
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D.2. Netherlands
In taxing the oil and gas sector, the Netherlands rely on two income-based instruments,
the CIT and the State Profit Share (SPS), and a production based royalty.
The SPS is a deductible expense for CIT purposes and for SPS purposes, a CIT credit
is given. Additionally, there is 10% cost-uplift for SPS purposes. This leads to
CIT = τc(P − SPS) and SPS = τs(P − rC)− CIT, (13)
where reported profits are denoted by P , costs by C and the cost uplift by r. Some algebra
reveals that the combined tax rate is given by
τNL = τs
[
1− rC
P
]
,
and thus increasing in the profit margin. The combined tax rate is equal to the rate of
the SPS, currently 50%, for a profit margin of 100%. Marginal savings by shifting income,
however, are constant and given by
∂τNLP
∂P
=
∂[P + r(P − I)]τs
∂P
= τs(1 + r),
if income is held constant. It is τs if costs are held constant. In the empirical analysis we
assume marginal savings of τs(1 + r/2).
D.3. Kazakhstan
The fiscal regime in Kazakhstan is a combination of two profit-based instruments, the
CIT and the Excess Profit Tax (EPT), as well as production-based instruments, taxes on
exports and bonuses.
The EPT is levied at increasing rates – between 0% and 60% – on the share of net income
after CIT that exceeds some threshold of allowable deductions.25 Profits satisfying
P (1− τ)
C
=
PM(1− τ)
1− PM ≤ z,
where τ denotes the CIT rate, P are profits, C deductible expenses, PM is the profit
margin, and z the threshold, are thus not taxed. In 2009, the threshold increased from
20% to 25% and, concurrently, the CIT rate decreased from 30% to 20%. This translates
into full exemption for the purpose of EPT if the profit margin was below 22% before 2009
and below 23% thereafter.
25In our derivation of the EPT, we assume that deductions for CIT and EPT purposes are the same.
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We demonstrate the derivation of marginal savings for a firm with a profit margin be-
tween 30% and 36%. Denote total income by P = P (x0 + x1 + x2), with
∑
xi = 1. The
share x0 of total income, defined implicitly by
x0P (1− τ)
C
= z, (14)
where C are allowable deductions, τ the CIT rate and z the threshold, is not taxed. The
share of excess profits that exceeds z of allowable deductions but not 30%, is taxed at a
marginal rate of τ1 = 10%. It is implicitly defined by
(x0 + x1)P (1− τ)
C
= 0.3, (15)
and (14). Finally, x2 is taxed at a marginal rate of τ2 = 20% and defined by the requirement
that shares sum to one. With these definitions, the EPT can be expressed as
EPT = P (1− τ)[x0τ0 + x1τ1 + x2τ2].
Substituting the expressions above, using C = I − P , and differentiating with respect to
P , we obtain
∂EPT
∂P
= (1.4− τ)τ2 − (0.3− z)τ1 (16)
which translates into marginal savings of 21% before 2009, and 23.5% thereafter. For a
profit margin below 30% we calculate marginal savings to be 9% and 10.5% for the years
before 2009 and thereafter, respectively.
The mean profit margin in our entire sample is slightly above 30%; for Kazakhstan it is
around 24%. In the empirical analysis, we split the Kazakh sample into firms with a profit
margin below and above 30% and apply the rates derived above.
D.4. Italy
Italy’s fiscal regime is a combination of CIT, royalties and a surcharge to corporation tax
for companies exceeding certain thresholds.
The surcharge was introduced at a rate of 6.5% in 2008 and imposed on companies with
gross revenues, in the preceding year, of more than Euro 25 million. In 2011, the rate was
increased to 10.5% and the scope extended to capture companies with gross revenues of
more than Euro 10 million or taxable income of more than Euro 1 million in the same year.
In calculating the combined rate, we incorporate the surcharge only for companies meet-
ing these conditions.
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